June 2020
				
Bert Gordon is professor emeritus of history at Mills College who specializes in modern European history. He was a Fulbright Fellow in Vienna and his Ph.D. thesis received honorable mention for the 1969 Austrian History Award. His most recent book is War Tourism: Second World War France from Defeat and Occupation to the Creation of Heritage (Cornell University Press, 2018).
				
					In your syllabus, you pose the question “Do current embroilments
					with Russia represent a return to Cold War days, when the world
					seemed on the brink of nuclear destruction?” How would you answer
					that?
				
				
				If I had to say “yes” or “no,” I would say “not quite.” During the
				Cold War, it was just the two nuclear superpowers, the US and the
				USSR, armed to the teeth. For those of us who lived through it,
				there was always the sense that at a moment's notice you might have
				a nuclear holocaust. What's interesting about Russia today is that
				if you look at their economy and economic power, they're not a major
				player at all — not, as it were, super — yet they've invested so
				much in armaments and sophisticated missiles they still command
				attention. Of course, one of the big differences between the Cold
				War days and now is the emergence of China on the world scene. It’s
				still unclear how their presence will impact relations among the
				three, but it no doubt will. So, do we have Cold War-like tensions?
				Absolutely, though I wouldn’t say we’re returning to full nuclear,
				Cold War-like hostilities. The atmospherics are different.
				
					Where does Russia fit culturally? Is it more Asian, more Western
					European, or something in-between?
				
				
				Virtually everybody who studies this agrees that while the vast
				majority of the landmass of Russia is in Asia, culturally Russia is
				definitely part of Europe. However, in many ways, it’s distinctly
				different, which creates a tense interplay between the Russians and
				the West, including the United States. Under Stalin during the
				industrialization, there was this slogan "Catch Up with the West" —
				meaning, among other things, “Catch Up with the United States.”
				
				I think that understanding this tussle, as it were, between
				emulation and resistance, between the push and pull of Western
				influences, should inform how we look at Putin and his government
				today. In a lot of ways, what Putin wants to do is emulate some
				characteristics of the West, as Stalin did before him, and Peter the
				Great did even earlier. But emulation — taking certain things from
				the west and not other things — is a delicate balance. What Putin
				wants to take from the west is technology, economic development,
				that sort of thing. What he doesn’t want to take is what we might
				call western liberalism and human rights, what we like to think of
				in the Declaration of the Rights of Man from the French Revolution
				and the Declaration of Independence from the United States. For
				Putin and people who think like Putin, it’s “thank you, but no thank
				you.”
				
					Currently, Putin seems to dominate and define how the world sees
					Russia. How do you view him?
				
				
				I see him as extremely careful and not rash. He does what he thinks
				he can get away with and, for the most part, has been successful.
				Hard to believe, but he’s been in power for 20 years now and has
				tried to change the Russian constitution to ensure that he’s in
				power for another 15 at least. Remember, he came to power in the
				late 1990s when Boris Yeltsin’s health was failing and the Russian
				economy was collapsing. When Yeltsin resigned, Putin came in and
				stabilized the economy, for better or worse, stopping the free-fall.
				In doing so, he opened the door to what we now refer to as the
				oligarchs and all that entails.
				
				For people like Putin, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the loss of
				the satellite countries, and the uprisings of breakaway ethnic
				groups are all a humiliation. Everything done since the fall of the
				Berlin Wall has been informed by the drive to hold on to the
				influence Russia, through the Soviet Union, once had or, at least,
				reclaim some of it.
				
					One of your recommended readings is by Barbara Evans Clements, A
					History of Women in Russia: From Earliest Times to the Present.
					Why was it important to you to shine a light on women’s voices?
				
				
I do it because the stories of women are as much a part of the
				fabric of history as are the men’s, yet rarely get the same kind of
				acknowledgement. In class, we’ll talk about people like Alexandra
				Kollontai who was quite active during the Revolutionary years. She
				was a Marxist and theoretician who wrote extensively about how
				communism would do away with inequality, do away with marriage, do
				away with housework — that women would be fully equal partners
				socially, politically, and culturally. It didn’t turn out that way,
				but that was the hope.
			

